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Stephanie Rickard is .lln associate professor at too London School of Economics. She studies 
international trade. Cum~ntly, she is researching non-tariff ban-iers 10 foreign trade, induding state 
subSidie-s and discriminatory p ublic procurement practices. 
Stephanie is a member of the st~ring committee of the International Political Economy Society 
OPES) and the editorial board of the journal lnternatiOnal Organitalion. She has appeared on BBC 
Radio 4's TOday p,ogramme to discuss various events in the g loba I economy, including the 
leadership contest at the World Trade Organitation (WTO). 
wrry do politicians in some democracies redistribute more than in others? I examine this question in 
the context of particularistic economie: policies, which selectively assist small g roups of citizens at 
the expense or many. Government-funded subsidies. for example, help people employed in the 
subSidited industry but do so at the expense or taxpayers. While the political motivations behind 
such policies are well understood, the cross-national variation is not Why dO elected leaders enact 
generous particularis'lic ecooomic policies in some democracies but not others? Industrial 
subSidies, for exampl,e, vary Signi ficantly across democracies. despite international restrictions on 
their use in bOth WTO and the EU agreements. 
Professor Riekard argues that electoral i ftSti tutions and economic geography work together to 
explain industrial sub:sidies are more generous in some countries tl'lan others. Electoral i ftSti tutions 
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generate incentives for politiciar'tS and parties to pursue certain (re-) election strategies. Geography determines whieh policies best 
accomplish the institutionally-generated electoral tactics. Sometimes particularistic economic polic ies are the most efficient option 
to aid (re-) election. In these cases, international economic agreements do l ittle to curb subsidy spending. 
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